Has anyone heard anything regarding possibly having two or three factor authentication on the 6P?
Ex. Require 2 of the 3 options for authentication
Fingerprint
Pin
Trusted devices
For further example, phone will only unlock with fingerprint if you have a trusted device in range. Or require a pin after fingerprint authenticating if there's no trusted device available.
Seems like it would be a great way to add security to a phone, any idea if this is possible in marshmallow?
Sent from my Nexus 6
Related
Is there any suggestion for software like the one below for the MDA, that will lock the ppc and ask for some pin before getting access to the data on there.
http://www.pocketgear.com/software_detail.asp?id=18993
Can't the built-in security feature satisfy you?
With tje stock locking application it interferes with the calls coming in and sometimes i endup missing calls...
i never had issues with using the ask for code and timeout set to 0
and missing calls
you're not required to type in the code to pick up the phone
I encrypt my external Micro SDCard, simply because in the event I loose my phone, all my photo's and notes are encrypted and not visible to a potential thief... even if my photo's are not sensitive I don't want some maggot scrolling through each one checking them out... it can be a trade off though with having to use the following:
Enabling encryption requires you to use a password lock screen (not swipe, face, pattern or PIN) - it has to be 8 characters including one number
This means that if you're frequently turning the screen on, or have a very short screen timeout, you're going to be constantly having to input the password
If you connect the phone to a computer via USB, the MTP connection won't work until you input the password on the phone
If you remove the SDCard from the phone and put it in an adapter connected to a PC, it seems like it's not recognized at all
I don't enable encryption on my phone though, simply because I use Cerberus to track and remotely lock/erase if need be. It gives me more satisfaction tracing a thief and being in a position to have them arrested than to lock them out of the phone completely... since phone encryption requires a boot-up password before Cerberus can trace.
Never had encryption, sim pin, unlock pin etc.
Sent from my GT-I9505 using Tapatalk 4 Beta
Theshawty said:
Never had encryption, sim pin, unlock pin etc.
Sent from my GT-I9505 using Tapatalk 4 Beta
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Damn thats some serious donations you have been sending over to XDA! I'm still waiting for another 4 stars, they are slow!
Back on topic.... I also use SIM PIN Lock to stop maggots from using my phone and cranking my bill through the roof. I hardly reboot my phone so its no biggie for me, plus it offers a nice layer of security.
What formatting is using your external sdcard?
do you know if Exfat is supported?
I want to encrypt my external sdcard, but i need files bigger than 4 GB
*bumping thread*
I need to know a secure approach to encrypt my SD-card using an Samsung SiV i9505 with Android 6.0.1, more specifically using "Optimized Cyanogenmod 13" latest version (2016-11-05) by JDCTeam.
I've tried playin' around a bit with Cryptonite but not with any success :/ (maybe this is outdated?). I've of course googled (no, duckduck.go'ed, another q why) but have'nt found any good guide to this.
I'm no master at Android, but I'm no newbie either, thou have'nt used 6.0.1 (Marshmallow) much!
Please give me an "pretty easy" guide or a hint for a good and secure app, or method, to successfully encrypt my SD-card with a strong encryption like Serpent, AES, etc!
My device is;
Samsung Galaxy SiV i9505 Intl. (jflte) I9505XXUEMKF
Kernel: 3.4.112-B--B-PWR-CORE-AOSP-v1.4
OptimizedCM-13.0-20161105-Stable6
Ver: M4B30X
(can provide more specific logs if needed, give info how)
Best & humble regards,
z
Trying to understand where the security/lock sit:
1) If the digcert was in the device then bootloader, kernel, or both, can be tied to a device, and then protected from change. Is that the case?
2) If the digcert was in either the bootloader or the kernel , they can be tied to one another, but then , if both were changed at the same time, security couldn't be enforced.
3) Any digcert has to be validated vs. a matching digcert. Those can exist at Samsung, at ATT, or both. In fact, from descriptions in other threads, they seem to be present at certain Best Buy stores, at least temporarily.
4) If '3' is correct (ANDIF '1' is not correct), then all that is need to circumvent the lock is again, a dual change to bootloader and kernel, or am I missing something?
5) If '3' is correct, it seems that part of the public-private key may sit at ATT and at VZW. While those two parts couldI] be different, the infrastructure to manage this would be more cumbersome then I give them credit to manage. Therefore, it would be a logical (yet WAG) assumption that VZW and ATT either
(a) rely on the Samsung master certificate and/or(b) have the same certificate as each other. Is there a way to test this 'b' theory?
Bump
flyboy43 said:
Trying to understand where the security/lock sit:
1) If the digcert was in the device then bootloader, kernel, or both, can be tied to a device, and then protected from change. Is that the case?
2) If the digcert was in either the bootloader or the kernel , they can be tied to one another, but then , if both were changed at the same time, security couldn't be enforced.
3) Any digcert has to be validated vs. a matching digcert. Those can exist at Samsung, at ATT, or both. In fact, from descriptions in other threads, they seem to be present at certain Best Buy stores, at least temporarily.
4) If '3' is correct (ANDIF '1' is not correct), then all that is need to circumvent the lock is again, a dual change to bootloader and kernel, or am I missing something?
5) If '3' is correct, it seems that part of the public-private key may sit at ATT and at VZW. While those two parts couldI] be different, the infrastructure to manage this would be more cumbersome then I give them credit to manage. Therefore, it would be a logical (yet WAG) assumption that VZW and ATT either
(a) rely on the Samsung master certificate and/or(b) have the same certificate as each other. Is there a way to test this 'b' theory?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Bump
flyboy43 said:
Trying to understand where the security/lock sit:
1) If the digcert was in the device then bootloader, kernel, or both, can be tied to a device, and then protected from change. Is that the case?
2) If the digcert was in either the bootloader or the kernel , they can be tied to one another, but then , if both were changed at the same time, security couldn't be enforced.
3) Any digcert has to be validated vs. a matching digcert. Those can exist at Samsung, at ATT, or both. In fact, from descriptions in other threads, they seem to be present at certain Best Buy stores, at least temporarily.
4) If '3' is correct (ANDIF '1' is not correct), then all that is need to circumvent the lock is again, a dual change to bootloader and kernel, or am I missing something?
5) If '3' is correct, it seems that part of the public-private key may sit at ATT and at VZW. While those two parts couldI] be different, the infrastructure to manage this would be more cumbersome then I give them credit to manage. Therefore, it would be a logical (yet WAG) assumption that VZW and ATT either
(a) rely on the Samsung master certificate and/or(b) have the same certificate as each other. Is there a way to test this 'b' theory?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
I recommend you take this to one of the bootloader discussion threads, the one in the Verizon S4 General section titled "If we are serious about unlocking this bootloader" or something like that seems to be more active. However, I can tell you that number 4 is incorrect on your list. ODIN packages flash bootloaders and kernels, but there is a counter on the phone that prevents older bootloaders and kernels from being flashed.
So I work as a consultant, and traffic sensitive information through my devices. Really interested by this device, but I am unfamiliar with Blackberry's practices as a company. Maybe some of you can help me.
Will the physical device be secure should someone physically get ahold of it? Particularly foreign governments. I travel frequently for work and it is not too far a possibility that my device could be seized, and it's vitally important that the contents stored locally be secure on the device. Not so much concerned about the obvious follies of the transmission of data as once it hits a network it's open for the taking anyway.
Thanks.
This device is supposed to just as secure as all other blackberry devices, since blackberry is the standard for enterprise servers i think this might be good for you.
It encrypts all data by default, has added security on top of androids usual.
It would definitely will be a step up from Nexus 6 that you are using. But, if you are having sensitive data on your phone. I dont know why you are using Nexus 6. You should be using something like BB passport or classic. Anyway, this phone has native encryption. Meaning, anything stored in the phone is encrypted.
But i believe the device is not rated up to the Government security clearance yet. But it does have hardened kernel and DTek security app to control what data each installed app can access.
I don't currently store anything on my phone, would just make life easier if I could. Thanks guys.
I seem to be having the opposite Smart Lock issue than most. I only have my two vehicles added as trusted devices - no voice recognition or trusted locations.
Problem is once I connect to my car's BT and Smart Lock unlocks the phone, it stays unlocked long after the BT connection terminates. I could be sitting in the house an hour later and the phone is still unlocked by by Smart Lock? Anyone else having this issue? Anyone solve it?
Thx!