A new super bug has been found by a security researcher, is is confirned the virus is transferred by radio frequency, infect all usb devices and all pcs on the network...
be aware everyone...
http://arstechnica.com/security/201...erious-mac-and-pc-malware-that-jumps-airgaps/
Has not been independently verified. So far only one security researcher has reported it and it seems far fetched at best.
sounds like woo
It's quite far fetched don't ya think? Only one reporter. I doubt it is real.
True, but these days anything is possible, all we can do is wait and see if it spreads
Sent from my GT-I9300 using xda app-developers app
It is impossible, and let me explain why.
A radio frequency is not powerful enough (from an electric current point of view) to induce any sort of data in a non-receiver device. That is, all devices which use radio to exchange data has a special part called a receiver which is made of a special material which is sensible to radio frequencies and causes electrons to go out. Usually, the data picked up by the receiver is also compressed, and additional decoding hardware is needed for said data to make sense. So even if the virus could be sent through to a receiver, it would automatically get "decompressed" and it would probably not get out alive from that.
Obviously, USB, speakers and Microphones do not use this kind of technologies. No other device apart from the transmitter and the receiver do, or if they do, it is not sensible enough, otherwise no electronic component could do its job due to the huge amount of interferences that would cause (we are surrounded by radio waves coming from various sources, ranging from the local radio post to the super massive black hole in the center of our galaxy).
Even if it were somehow possible to induce a virus on a USB device, pretty much any security system will catch it spot on.
It is impossible for a speaker to send data back to its master device (electricity only goes one way through your speaker's cable).
Microphones can not pick up radio waves (they do not have a receiver). They only pick up vibrations in the air.
Motherboards are shielded from EM. Unless a very powerful EMP hits it, there is no way radio frequencies could affect bios. And even if it were not shielded, writing data to BIOS chips requires a high voltage electrical current, which will probably damage the motherboard if it was running something else.
Erm... I'm sorry, but that is absolutely incorrect. While a lot of skepticism about this attack is absolutely warranted, the physics involved are not in any way the reason. I suspect that the source of your confusion is that you're confusing the communication method between infected machines (the ultrasonic sound waves) for an infection vector; it is not. You still make many false claims, though.
First point: a (sufficiently powerful) radio transmission can *easily* disrupt electronic devices not intended as receivers. Ask any HAM radio operator, especially if they have ever tried to use a PC near their rig. Iron ferrite "chokes" are used on wires (such as video, mouse, and keyboard cables, among others) to absorb signals which originate from high-frequency sources like radio waves. While it's true that equipment not specifically intended to receive radio frequencies is *usually* not interfered with unless the source of the interference is fairly strong or fairly close (only a few Watts of broadcast power in close proximity, but it falls off very rapidly with distance), it's inaccurate to claim that it doesn't happen.
Second point: the "special material" which receivers are made of is typically copper. It can be any conductive material, though. A basic knowledge of electromagnetism would make this pretty obvious; as a changing electromagnetic field (such as a radio wave) intersecting an electrical conductor (such as a radio antenna, which is often basically just a copper wire or tube with an anti-corrosion coating on it) will induce an electric field in the conductor. It's true that the conductor needs to be "tuned" (modified to have an effective length which is - typically - some integer fraction of the wavelength of the EM wave) in order to establish the standing waves (constructive interference; this is *slightly* more advanced physics) necessary to make that frequency stand out enough to generate a particularly strong electrical signal, but it's not very hard to tune an antenna. Your typical civilian FM radio broadcasts, for example, span a considerable frequency range with a difference in wavelength of around 25% from the highest to the lowest frequency, yet your car (or phone) can receive them all using the same antenna.
Third point: compression is irrelevant. If you're communicating between two devices which are *supposed* to communicate, such as between WiFi adapters, the decoding will happen automatically in the hardware. If you're communicating between two analog interfaces, such as a speaker and a microphone, the signals will pass through an ADC - an Analog/Digital Converter - to transform them between the digital format that the computing hardware understands and the analog waveforms of the transmission medium.
Fourth point: there is absolutely no reason why you couldn't infect a system through a USB device. When a USB port is connected, the machine queries the device for its particulars, including the device ID (how your computer knows the difference between an iPod and a printer), USB interface version, and other metadata. This happens even in modern BIOSes and EFI systems; how else could a computer boot from a flashdrive or external hard drive or USB-connected floppy drive? A vulnerability in the code which handles this handshaking could be exploited by the device - after all, there's an exchange of data going on, and the data needs to be parsed and processed - to take over the system at the firmware level.
Fifth point (but related to fourth): exactly *what* sort of "security system" do you expect to catch this? Your antivirus program, the one that runs as a process on the CPU and probably doesn't even pay attention to USB connections and disconnections, only to file systems being mounted or removed? Your state-of-the-art BIOS security, which amounts to requiring a password before running the Setup program and allowing you to block writes to the boot sector of the disk? The machine you pass every USB device through before connecting it to your computer, which uncaps the chips and traces out all their circuitry looking for anything that would send unexpected data?
Sixth point: You want to know the difference between a speaker and a microphone? Whether you pay attention to the currents constantly travelling on the wire from the transducer, or only bother applying your own currents to make the driver move. Mics typically need amplification (a trivially simple electrical circuit, by the way, EE101 material if you didn't learn it earlier) before the signals are strong enough to drive another speaker loudly enough for you to hear it, and it's possible to make a transducer which is much better suited to be a speaker or a mic, but either one can act as either.
Seventh point: pretty irrelevant, but unless you put a diode on that wire, electricity can flow down a wire in either direction. Speakers (and mics) don't typically have diodes. In fact, sometimes they are explicitly designed to have electricity flow in both directions as the sound waves move the magnet closer and further from the coil (for electromagnet-driven microphones; there are other kinds) or the electrical signals flow one direction to push the driver's magnet out and the other direction to draw it closer in (for electromagnet-driven speakers).
Eighth point: also pretty irrelevant, but speaker and microphone cables actually make pretty decent radio antennas. Ever noticed how smartphones require you to have headphones connected before the phone can pick up FM radio? That's because it uses the wire to pick up the signals from the radio waves. The frequencies are much too high for you to hear - typically radio waves in in the range of hundreds of kilohertz up well into the gigahertz, while audio signals are only a handful of kilohertz (most humans can't hear any higher than the low double digits of KHz). They are also *usually* pretty faint, but not always. Try listening to a speaker whose wire goes past a poorly-shielded AC motor (or anything else with significant AC current flow) and you'll hear a distinct 60Hz (or 50Hz, depending on what the mains in your country uses) hum. It's low-pitched, but it's audible, and it is coming from the AC wires and/or equipment into your speaker wires, then being rendered into sound by the speaker drivers.
Ninth point: back to the malware at hand, the radio waves aren't affecting the BIOS directly at all. The radio waves are being picked up by the radio transceiver (you would probably call it a WiFi adapter) and being converted into digital signals, then those signals are being sent to the rest of the computer. With the right exploits in the OS and/or BIOS, those signals could trigger the firmware flashing system, overwriting your BIOS/EFI with data from the transmitting computer.
Tenth point, and looping back to something you seem to have misunderstood from the beginning: the reason that this malware is so unusual is because it communicates between infected machines without any conventional network interface (including WiFi); instead, transmissions are sent via the speakers and received via the microphones. Some very low-level program is monitoring the data from the mic at all times (no different really, aside from being hidden, than any other program that listens to the microphone), looking for any waveforms that resemble the data it expects. Because this data is sent at a range outside of human hearing, you don't even notice it happening. Because it doesn't go over the conventional network interfaces, it works on "airgapped" computers that have their conventional interfaces disabled or removed. It probably doesn't have much range - the speakers aren't that powerful (or microphones that sensitive), especially so far outside their designed optimum frequency range, and there will be a lot of interference - but normally it's considered safe to have airgapped PCs sitting in the same room as one another, so you can analyze one (with the malware on it) while you remain connected to the Internet on the other.
I repeat: I remain skeptical. The infection vector is not fully determined right now, and the proposed option - USB devices (as opposed to data within USB devices) that attack the system they are connected to - is conceivable but unlikely. The concept of using the speakers and microphone as a short-range communication bus between airgapped machines is totally possible - it's been done before - but the use of sound as a communication medium was not conclusively proven, and anything well outside of human hearing range is going to be hard for the speakers to send and mics to pick up, most likely. The concept of malware that attacks the system firmware is totally reasonable, but usually it woul need to be very precisely targeted at that firmware; two Lenovos of the same family might both be vulnerable, a Lenovo and a Dell probably wouldn't be unless the attack was extremely sophisticated.
The most unlikely part of the story is frankly that it's so incredibly persistently attacking this one individual, but nobody else has reported it. There are a *lot* of security researchers in the world, with a lot of flashdrives being passed around between people and a lot of PCs that they've been connected to, and nobody else has noticed this attack despite it having some pretty clear markers Without independent verification and ideally a bit more study, it remains, at best, a curiosity.
Whatever it is, it doesn't come close to warranting a thread with WARNING in the subject line! @ricky310711, you should feel ashamed of yourself for trying to spread fear. Your summary of how this thing is believed to operate is almost as inaccurate as your assessment of its threat level, and overly sensational besides. For shame!
GoodDayToDie said:
Erm... I'm sorry, but that is absolutely incorrect. While a lot of skepticism about this attack is absolutely warranted, the physics involved are not in any way the reason. I suspect that the source of your confusion is that you're confusing the communication method between infected machines (the ultrasonic sound waves) for an infection vector; it is not. You still make many false claims, though.
First point: a (sufficiently powerful) radio transmission can *easily* disrupt electronic devices not intended as receivers. Ask any HAM radio operator, especially if they have ever tried to use a PC near their rig. Iron ferrite "chokes" are used on wires (such as video, mouse, and keyboard cables, among others) to absorb signals which originate from high-frequency sources like radio waves. While it's true that equipment not specifically intended to receive radio frequencies is *usually* not interfered with unless the source of the interference is fairly strong or fairly close (only a few Watts of broadcast power in close proximity, but it falls off very rapidly with distance), it's inaccurate to claim that it doesn't happen.
Second point: the "special material" which receivers are made of is typically copper. It can be any conductive material, though. A basic knowledge of electromagnetism would make this pretty obvious; as a changing electromagnetic field (such as a radio wave) intersecting an electrical conductor (such as a radio antenna, which is often basically just a copper wire or tube with an anti-corrosion coating on it) will induce an electric field in the conductor. It's true that the conductor needs to be "tuned" (modified to have an effective length which is - typically - some integer fraction of the wavelength of the EM wave) in order to establish the standing waves (constructive interference; this is *slightly* more advanced physics) necessary to make that frequency stand out enough to generate a particularly strong electrical signal, but it's not very hard to tune an antenna. Your typical civilian FM radio broadcasts, for example, span a considerable frequency range with a difference in wavelength of around 25% from the highest to the lowest frequency, yet your car (or phone) can receive them all using the same antenna.
Third point: compression is irrelevant. If you're communicating between two devices which are *supposed* to communicate, such as between WiFi adapters, the decoding will happen automatically in the hardware. If you're communicating between two analog interfaces, such as a speaker and a microphone, the signals will pass through an ADC - an Analog/Digital Converter - to transform them between the digital format that the computing hardware understands and the analog waveforms of the transmission medium.
Fourth point: there is absolutely no reason why you couldn't infect a system through a USB device. When a USB port is connected, the machine queries the device for its particulars, including the device ID (how your computer knows the difference between an iPod and a printer), USB interface version, and other metadata. This happens even in modern BIOSes and EFI systems; how else could a computer boot from a flashdrive or external hard drive or USB-connected floppy drive? A vulnerability in the code which handles this handshaking could be exploited by the device - after all, there's an exchange of data going on, and the data needs to be parsed and processed - to take over the system at the firmware level.
Fifth point (but related to fourth): exactly *what* sort of "security system" do you expect to catch this? Your antivirus program, the one that runs as a process on the CPU and probably doesn't even pay attention to USB connections and disconnections, only to file systems being mounted or removed? Your state-of-the-art BIOS security, which amounts to requiring a password before running the Setup program and allowing you to block writes to the boot sector of the disk? The machine you pass every USB device through before connecting it to your computer, which uncaps the chips and traces out all their circuitry looking for anything that would send unexpected data?
Sixth point: You want to know the difference between a speaker and a microphone? Whether you pay attention to the currents constantly travelling on the wire from the transducer, or only bother applying your own currents to make the driver move. Mics typically need amplification (a trivially simple electrical circuit, by the way, EE101 material if you didn't learn it earlier) before the signals are strong enough to drive another speaker loudly enough for you to hear it, and it's possible to make a transducer which is much better suited to be a speaker or a mic, but either one can act as either.
Seventh point: pretty irrelevant, but unless you put a diode on that wire, electricity can flow down a wire in either direction. Speakers (and mics) don't typically have diodes. In fact, sometimes they are explicitly designed to have electricity flow in both directions as the sound waves move the magnet closer and further from the coil (for electromagnet-driven microphones; there are other kinds) or the electrical signals flow one direction to push the driver's magnet out and the other direction to draw it closer in (for electromagnet-driven speakers).
Eighth point: also pretty irrelevant, but speaker and microphone cables actually make pretty decent radio antennas. Ever noticed how smartphones require you to have headphones connected before the phone can pick up FM radio? That's because it uses the wire to pick up the signals from the radio waves. The frequencies are much too high for you to hear - typically radio waves in in the range of hundreds of kilohertz up well into the gigahertz, while audio signals are only a handful of kilohertz (most humans can't hear any higher than the low double digits of KHz). They are also *usually* pretty faint, but not always. Try listening to a speaker whose wire goes past a poorly-shielded AC motor (or anything else with significant AC current flow) and you'll hear a distinct 60Hz (or 50Hz, depending on what the mains in your country uses) hum. It's low-pitched, but it's audible, and it is coming from the AC wires and/or equipment into your speaker wires, then being rendered into sound by the speaker drivers.
Ninth point: back to the malware at hand, the radio waves aren't affecting the BIOS directly at all. The radio waves are being picked up by the radio transceiver (you would probably call it a WiFi adapter) and being converted into digital signals, then those signals are being sent to the rest of the computer. With the right exploits in the OS and/or BIOS, those signals could trigger the firmware flashing system, overwriting your BIOS/EFI with data from the transmitting computer.
Tenth point, and looping back to something you seem to have misunderstood from the beginning: the reason that this malware is so unusual is because it communicates between infected machines without any conventional network interface (including WiFi); instead, transmissions are sent via the speakers and received via the microphones. Some very low-level program is monitoring the data from the mic at all times (no different really, aside from being hidden, than any other program that listens to the microphone), looking for any waveforms that resemble the data it expects. Because this data is sent at a range outside of human hearing, you don't even notice it happening. Because it doesn't go over the conventional network interfaces, it works on "airgapped" computers that have their conventional interfaces disabled or removed. It probably doesn't have much range - the speakers aren't that powerful (or microphones that sensitive), especially so far outside their designed optimum frequency range, and there will be a lot of interference - but normally it's considered safe to have airgapped PCs sitting in the same room as one another, so you can analyze one (with the malware on it) while you remain connected to the Internet on the other.
I repeat: I remain skeptical. The infection vector is not fully determined right now, and the proposed option - USB devices (as opposed to data within USB devices) that attack the system they are connected to - is conceivable but unlikely. The concept of using the speakers and microphone as a short-range communication bus between airgapped machines is totally possible - it's been done before - but the use of sound as a communication medium was not conclusively proven, and anything well outside of human hearing range is going to be hard for the speakers to send and mics to pick up, most likely. The concept of malware that attacks the system firmware is totally reasonable, but usually it woul need to be very precisely targeted at that firmware; two Lenovos of the same family might both be vulnerable, a Lenovo and a Dell probably wouldn't be unless the attack was extremely sophisticated.
The most unlikely part of the story is frankly that it's so incredibly persistently attacking this one individual, but nobody else has reported it. There are a *lot* of security researchers in the world, with a lot of flashdrives being passed around between people and a lot of PCs that they've been connected to, and nobody else has noticed this attack despite it having some pretty clear markers Without independent verification and ideally a bit more study, it remains, at best, a curiosity.
Whatever it is, it doesn't come close to warranting a thread with WARNING in the subject line! @ricky310711, you should feel ashamed of yourself for trying to spread fear. Your summary of how this thing is believed to operate is almost as inaccurate as your assessment of its threat level, and overly sensational besides. For shame!
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
Hahaha, this made me laugh. You should feel ashamed of yourself due to the lack of respect you have. I simply read an article and shared it to warn other, you may have your opinion but telling me I should be ashamed of myself , I took it as an insult.
Now either discuss the topic without insulting others or don't be reply at all. Theres a report button I'm I'm close to using it.
GoodDayToDie said:
Erm... I'm sorry, but that is absolutely incorrect. While a lot of skepticism about this attack is absolutely warranted, the physics involved are not in any way the reason. I suspect that the source of your confusion is that you're confusing the communication method between infected machines (the ultrasonic sound waves) for an infection vector; it is not. You still make many false claims, though.
First point: a (sufficiently powerful) radio transmission can *easily* disrupt electronic devices not intended as receivers. Ask any HAM radio operator, especially if they have ever tried to use a PC near their rig. Iron ferrite "chokes" are used on wires (such as video, mouse, and keyboard cables, among others) to absorb signals which originate from high-frequency sources like radio waves. While it's true that equipment not specifically intended to receive radio frequencies is *usually* not interfered with unless the source of the interference is fairly strong or fairly close (only a few Watts of broadcast power in close proximity, but it falls off very rapidly with distance), it's inaccurate to claim that it doesn't happen.
Second point: the "special material" which receivers are made of is typically copper. It can be any conductive material, though. A basic knowledge of electromagnetism would make this pretty obvious; as a changing electromagnetic field (such as a radio wave) intersecting an electrical conductor (such as a radio antenna, which is often basically just a copper wire or tube with an anti-corrosion coating on it) will induce an electric field in the conductor. It's true that the conductor needs to be "tuned" (modified to have an effective length which is - typically - some integer fraction of the wavelength of the EM wave) in order to establish the standing waves (constructive interference; this is *slightly* more advanced physics) necessary to make that frequency stand out enough to generate a particularly strong electrical signal, but it's not very hard to tune an antenna. Your typical civilian FM radio broadcasts, for example, span a considerable frequency range with a difference in wavelength of around 25% from the highest to the lowest frequency, yet your car (or phone) can receive them all using the same antenna.
Third point: compression is irrelevant. If you're communicating between two devices which are *supposed* to communicate, such as between WiFi adapters, the decoding will happen automatically in the hardware. If you're communicating between two analog interfaces, such as a speaker and a microphone, the signals will pass through an ADC - an Analog/Digital Converter - to transform them between the digital format that the computing hardware understands and the analog waveforms of the transmission medium.
Fourth point: there is absolutely no reason why you couldn't infect a system through a USB device. When a USB port is connected, the machine queries the device for its particulars, including the device ID (how your computer knows the difference between an iPod and a printer), USB interface version, and other metadata. This happens even in modern BIOSes and EFI systems; how else could a computer boot from a flashdrive or external hard drive or USB-connected floppy drive? A vulnerability in the code which handles this handshaking could be exploited by the device - after all, there's an exchange of data going on, and the data needs to be parsed and processed - to take over the system at the firmware level.
Fifth point (but related to fourth): exactly *what* sort of "security system" do you expect to catch this? Your antivirus program, the one that runs as a process on the CPU and probably doesn't even pay attention to USB connections and disconnections, only to file systems being mounted or removed? Your state-of-the-art BIOS security, which amounts to requiring a password before running the Setup program and allowing you to block writes to the boot sector of the disk? The machine you pass every USB device through before connecting it to your computer, which uncaps the chips and traces out all their circuitry looking for anything that would send unexpected data?
Sixth point: You want to know the difference between a speaker and a microphone? Whether you pay attention to the currents constantly travelling on the wire from the transducer, or only bother applying your own currents to make the driver move. Mics typically need amplification (a trivially simple electrical circuit, by the way, EE101 material if you didn't learn it earlier) before the signals are strong enough to drive another speaker loudly enough for you to hear it, and it's possible to make a transducer which is much better suited to be a speaker or a mic, but either one can act as either.
Seventh point: pretty irrelevant, but unless you put a diode on that wire, electricity can flow down a wire in either direction. Speakers (and mics) don't typically have diodes. In fact, sometimes they are explicitly designed to have electricity flow in both directions as the sound waves move the magnet closer and further from the coil (for electromagnet-driven microphones; there are other kinds) or the electrical signals flow one direction to push the driver's magnet out and the other direction to draw it closer in (for electromagnet-driven speakers).
Eighth point: also pretty irrelevant, but speaker and microphone cables actually make pretty decent radio antennas. Ever noticed how smartphones require you to have headphones connected before the phone can pick up FM radio? That's because it uses the wire to pick up the signals from the radio waves. The frequencies are much too high for you to hear - typically radio waves in in the range of hundreds of kilohertz up well into the gigahertz, while audio signals are only a handful of kilohertz (most humans can't hear any higher than the low double digits of KHz). They are also *usually* pretty faint, but not always. Try listening to a speaker whose wire goes past a poorly-shielded AC motor (or anything else with significant AC current flow) and you'll hear a distinct 60Hz (or 50Hz, depending on what the mains in your country uses) hum. It's low-pitched, but it's audible, and it is coming from the AC wires and/or equipment into your speaker wires, then being rendered into sound by the speaker drivers.
Ninth point: back to the malware at hand, the radio waves aren't affecting the BIOS directly at all. The radio waves are being picked up by the radio transceiver (you would probably call it a WiFi adapter) and being converted into digital signals, then those signals are being sent to the rest of the computer. With the right exploits in the OS and/or BIOS, those signals could trigger the firmware flashing system, overwriting your BIOS/EFI with data from the transmitting computer.
Tenth point, and looping back to something you seem to have misunderstood from the beginning: the reason that this malware is so unusual is because it communicates between infected machines without any conventional network interface (including WiFi); instead, transmissions are sent via the speakers and received via the microphones. Some very low-level program is monitoring the data from the mic at all times (no different really, aside from being hidden, than any other program that listens to the microphone), looking for any waveforms that resemble the data it expects. Because this data is sent at a range outside of human hearing, you don't even notice it happening. Because it doesn't go over the conventional network interfaces, it works on "airgapped" computers that have their conventional interfaces disabled or removed. It probably doesn't have much range - the speakers aren't that powerful (or microphones that sensitive), especially so far outside their designed optimum frequency range, and there will be a lot of interference - but normally it's considered safe to have airgapped PCs sitting in the same room as one another, so you can analyze one (with the malware on it) while you remain connected to the Internet on the other.
I repeat: I remain skeptical. The infection vector is not fully determined right now, and the proposed option - USB devices (as opposed to data within USB devices) that attack the system they are connected to - is conceivable but unlikely. The concept of using the speakers and microphone as a short-range communication bus between airgapped machines is totally possible - it's been done before - but the use of sound as a communication medium was not conclusively proven, and anything well outside of human hearing range is going to be hard for the speakers to send and mics to pick up, most likely. The concept of malware that attacks the system firmware is totally reasonable, but usually it woul need to be very precisely targeted at that firmware; two Lenovos of the same family might both be vulnerable, a Lenovo and a Dell probably wouldn't be unless the attack was extremely sophisticated.
The most unlikely part of the story is frankly that it's so incredibly persistently attacking this one individual, but nobody else has reported it. There are a *lot* of security researchers in the world, with a lot of flashdrives being passed around between people and a lot of PCs that they've been connected to, and nobody else has noticed this attack despite it having some pretty clear markers Without independent verification and ideally a bit more study, it remains, at best, a curiosity.
Whatever it is, it doesn't come close to warranting a thread with WARNING in the subject line! @ricky310711, you should feel ashamed of yourself for trying to spread fear. Your summary of how this thing is believed to operate is almost as inaccurate as your assessment of its threat level, and overly sensational besides. For shame!
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
You completely missed my point, aside from the green text
The long list of things were to correct misconceptions about the technologies involved; both for you and the OP. I'm aware that most of them aren't related to BadBIOS itself, really, just corrections to misinformation about subjects related to BadBIOS, but if you're going to tell somebody they're wrong you should make sense and avoid factual errors while doing so...
@ricky310711 I'd say I'm sorry, but I'm not, really... this is the forum equivalent of a email chain letter, sent by somebody who read something they didn't understand and then muddled it up further (I'm not sure which is worse, that you claimed it *spread* by radio, that you claimed it spread *by radio*, or that you claimed that this spreading by radio was *confirmed*; they're pretty much all wrong), added a huge load of sensationalism and fearmongering, and blasted out to everybody to "warn us." Warn us of what? Even if you'd gotten the description even remotely right, what exactly were we supposed to do about it? Not connect any strange USB devices to our computer? That's generally good advice - though also inconvenient, so nobody ever actually follows it except in high-sensitivity work unless they are paranoid - but you didn't actually say anything of the sort!
I have actually researched this, so far I havent came to a conclusion that this actually exist but I have seen videos and found out it has possible for the high radio frequency transfer?
Sent from my GT-I9300 using xda app-developers app
ricky310711 said:
I have actually researched this, so far I havent came to a conclusion that this actually exist but I have seen videos and found out it has possible for the high radio frequency transfer?
Sent from my GT-I9300 using xda app-developers app
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
No, its not possible to send data via RF transfer without the other machine being prepared for this (wifi for example is radio, but is prepared only for 2.4ghz or sometimes 5ghz transfers of a specific type). Your PC doesnt have proper transmission abilities either beyond wifi and bluetooth etc which again are specific data.
You cannot just have a machine sit idle and magically generate a radio signal which will infect another machine with a virus.
Correct. Note that it doesn't necessarily need to be doing much more than having the radio on, though. For example, when your WiFi adapter scans for networks to join (like it does repeatedly when on but unconnected) it receives data from other devices and parses it. A vulnerability in that parser could be exploited, and if it were a really bad vulnerability, malware could conceivable spread that way. I'm pretty sure that's not what's happening here; security researchers know better than to bring an infected machine with an active WiFi adapter into range of another active WiFi adapter.
GoodDayToDie said:
Correct. Note that it doesn't necessarily need to be doing much more than having the radio on, though. For example, when your WiFi adapter scans for networks to join (like it does repeatedly when on but unconnected) it receives data from other devices and parses it. A vulnerability in that parser could be exploited, and if it were a really bad vulnerability, malware could conceivable spread that way. I'm pretty sure that's not what's happening here; security researchers know better than to bring an infected machine with an active WiFi adapter into range of another active WiFi adapter.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
There is that issue yes (haven't heard of this being done via wifi, have heard of an older intel NIC having a similar exploit though) but of course 1 exploit would likely only work on one specific wifi card family or possibly only one model within that family. An exploit for my old laptops broadcom wifi adapter likely wouldnt impact the qualcomm atheros adapter in my current laptop.
Which kinda brings me onto something else.
The researcher listed a few devices which had their bios firmware infected and many of them used entirely different motherboard chipsets, heck, he claimed a mac was infected and the chipsets driving their bios are totally different from those usually found in other machines.
Related
Please be gentle with me, it's my first time, etc etc...
I have a tandem bicycle, and me and the g/f often go off on longish daytrips. It is in the design of most tandems that the shorter person has to go on the back. This means that they can see nothing forwards at all. As she does the navigating this means I have to keep up a constant commentary of what junctions and landmarks are coming towards us while she tries to tally that with the OS map.
I have a pair of HD2s and an old Touch HD with plenty of spare batteries, car holders etc.
I would love to find a way to use a remote camera on the front of the tandem and let her use one of the HD2s as the screen, especially as it has CoPilot live on it which would make the navigation much easier. (I know I said rear view in the title, but I suspect fewer people would look at the thread if I tried to put what I really want up there, and it's no different really.)
I understand that the 'phone's usb ports don't have the required hardware / software to allow me to plug a usb webcam into them.
I suspect that the way forward is to use one HD2 on the front as a bluetooth camera and give her the other as the display, but I doubt that this will be easy, and it will use way more power than a hardwired system which is an issue on a 'bicycle. It already weighs 1/5 tonne with the two of us and some touring gear, so adding a big central power supply would be a shame but is probably inevitable.
There was a brief thread on this on XDA dev in about 2005:
http://forum.xda-developers.com/showthread.php?t=243337&styleid=15
but it never went anywhere and will now be completely out of date.
Hopefully someone can help or point me in the right direction. Sadly I have no coding skills at all, so it needs to be off the shelf h/w or s/w...
Thanks for reading
ed.
wow...thats one big project you are thinking off...ok, all things cut short, your best bet will be a Bluetooth camera or a wi-fi camera/webcam. for the former, it can be done, but there arent custom drivers that you can just download to support it. even Bluetooth keyboards only recently started working with the HD2. However, what you can do, that will definitely work is a wi-fi based camera. im sure you are familiar with these. these camera have their own IP address and transmit the feed live via a wireless connection. from my experience, it works quite well, but it really depends on the gear you are using. if you are using a good wifi camera(im not familiar with the brands,but obviously the mid ranged ones will be considered good. If you cant find standalone cams, then buy a small wifi surveillance cam), then there will be a stable and lag free transmission. However, to get smooth feed, you need a good network connection. It will be best if you have a fast data or broadband connection on your phone. 3-4MBPS+ will be fine. Then of course, u need to enable your phone as a modem to connect to the camera. I have tried wifi cameras using a wi-fi connection, both on my PC and my HD2. It works smoothly. The cameras were fixed on R/C helicopters and worked at a range of 20m from the modem. Then again, i really have no idea how well it will work for your case. It should be ok, but not sure about 'good'. You can try!
Alternatively, a more compact method will be to disassemble your HD2 right down to the camera and remove the lens cover. Then, disconnect the actual camera from the phone. Get the correct ribbon cable from your local store. I do not know the specifications of the particular cable, but you try going to a smartphone repair shop that sells replacement cameras for the HD2 and take a look at the ribbon cable. Then, you can search for longer ones or manually solder low resistance jumper wires from the connections(there a alot of connections mind you). If you want to do this, please get info on proper disassembly instructions and do alot of research!.
i really admire your endeavor and although it may be hard, best of luck to you and hope you succeed, should you undertake this. Nevertheless, just some small advice...If you are also considering about the budget factor, i think it could be equally expensive or cheap to buy a purpose built remote camera which can connect to a screen.
-cheers
A wi-fi camera on a helmet would give flexibility as to what you were able to view ie could move head to point camera in the direction that one wanted to view
Good luck
Thankyou both!
Sorry I've been a bit slow replying, home internet connection has been intermittent for a week or so...
Kawshigan, can you clarify something for me, when you talk about "fast data or broadband connection on your phone. 3-4MBPS+" are you saying that I should be sending the data via the cellular network? If so that is not going to happen. I don't know where you live but here in Canterbury, a small city in the most populated part of the UK about 50 miles from London, 3G is a dream. There is a 3G service of course, but it is so weak that it is unusable even in the town centre, so trying to use it away from the town for my project will be impossible (and would be very very expensive as we get only 500MB / month here cheaply.)
If you mean forming a wifi connection between the two phones, which I suspect IS what you mean, then surely the speed of the connection is whatever hardware can do, allowing for distance which is about 3' in this case.
I agree that a ready-made system should be a similar price but they do not seem to exist. There is something in the US but it is very expensive ($600?) and is intended more for recording accidents really. certainly it has no nav function. I'm too new here to post links but if you Google on "cerevllum.com" you'll see it, beautiful, expensive & only half the tool I need.
It seems such an obvious thing to do with a smartphone (the rear view camera I mean) as mirrors on bicycles don't work well, and most of the components seem to exist, it just needs someone to tie them together.
I suspect that putting an external camera on my Touch HD is beyond me. My soldering skills are ok, but surface mount stuff is beyond me, not least because I'm 45 years old and my eyesight isn't up to it anymore...
But then again, even as I type this I realise what you actually mean, is to mount the HD2's own camera remotely at the front of the bike and run a long ribbon cable to the rear handlebars. Now THAT is a GOOD idea. Probably I'd start with the Touch HD as my HD2 is still my everyday 'phone and I hope to keep it that way for ever. When I get some time I'll pull the Touch apart and see if it is possible. How long could the cable be before s/n & voltage drop problems etc became too much, I wonder?
The helmet cam doesn't really work as the problem is not so much positioning a camera, (I can do that on the handlebars) but how to get an instant display of what the noggin-cam is seeing onto the screen of a smart phone? The problem with the helmet cam is that I think the viewer would have the same problem that you get watching YouTube videos where the camera is bouncing around and rarely pointing in the right place all the time. The Tandem has good suspension at both ends so it would be ok on the 'bars I think. ( Google on "VCA 2010 Race" for an amazing video that shows this problem a little, and no, we don't do that on the Tandem...)
So when you remoted the CMOS sensor...
Did you end up giving the "extra long ribbon cable" idea a try and if so how did it work (or not. Interested in how it came out.
Need to boost the signal on my Nexus S, it's almost unusable and switching to 3G in the next room from the router (expensive here in rural .au).
Tried three routers, channels, different devices etc.. it all points to a crap antenna in the nexus S or a crap wi-fi implementation.
I'm going to have a go at hacking it and while I have some experience messing with hardware, I've never successfully modded an aerial, I expect there's too much theory involved for me as whenever I read up on it there's a lot of conflicting info.
Anyway at this point my options I'm considering are:
- Cut internal antenna at start, wire in notebook wifi antenna (including cable/not including cable?)
- wire in notebook wifi antenna at end of internal antenna (including cable/not including cable?)
- wire in notebook wifi antenna at start of internal antenna (including cable/not including cable?)
Given that length is of utmost importance with antenna I'm hoping that it'll just go from a 1/4 length antenna to a 1/2 length or some such but does someone want to correct me?
Guess I'll just test it myself..
I couldn't find any other threads about this (with solutions) so I'll document as I go.
Anyone want to offer any advice before I get started tonight?
Well you should take into consideration the wavelength you use for the wifi router. That is all I really know. Too long an antenna and it wont even get those waves... too short as well, but wavelength depends also on the channel number router is on.
Sent from my SCH-I500 (Samsung Fascinate) using Tapatalk 2
defroster said:
Need to boost the signal on my Nexus S, it's almost unusable and switching to 3G in the next room from the router (expensive here in rural .au).
Tried three routers, channels, different devices etc.. it all points to a crap antenna in the nexus S or a crap wi-fi implementation.
I'm going to have a go at hacking it and while I have some experience messing with hardware, I've never successfully modded an aerial, I expect there's too much theory involved for me as whenever I read up on it there's a lot of conflicting info.
Anyway at this point my options I'm considering are:
- Cut internal antenna at start, wire in notebook wifi antenna (including cable/not including cable?)
- wire in notebook wifi antenna at end of internal antenna (including cable/not including cable?)
- wire in notebook wifi antenna at start of internal antenna (including cable/not including cable?)
Given that length is of utmost importance with antenna I'm hoping that it'll just go from a 1/4 length antenna to a 1/2 length or some such but does someone want to correct me?
Guess I'll just test it myself..
I couldn't find any other threads about this (with solutions) so I'll document as I go.
Anyone want to offer any advice before I get started tonight?
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
On your router have you tried to set the Radio Band to 20MHz?? This will increase your range but lower your bandwidth.
One other thing is to shield your antenna with foil on one side to make it more directional.
Just some thoughts...
If you do try to change the internal antenna, you will need to calculate the correct length for it to work effectively, just as point99trash2011 stated.
Antenna Length Calculation
yep i've tried 20mhz, and the problem isn't just with my router, i need decent wifi on the phone for use with any router and also to control my ar drone.
haven't got around to cracking it open yet.
Hi all,
I already had an older post asking for what the unpopulated soldered line of pads close to the Samsung flash memory chip might be useful for. To me it's clear already that it has been used during development (e.g. from the kernel sources it looks like they used to connect an ethernet interface to those pins).
Yesterday I spent some time probing for signals with an oscilloscope. There's already good news to those who might think about extending flash memory size of the Kindle Fire: pads 1-4 are directly connected to the OMAP4's MCSPI1_{CLK,SOMI,SIMO,CS0}, pads 36-37 carry GND and pads 39-40 carry 4.2V (unregulated from battery I guess as it's also not switched off when KF is off). The MCSPI can be configured to 48MHz (according to the kernel sources) and we can start connecting SPI hardware to it. I did for fun with some tiny CAN controller I had lying around and that worked out of the box using the spidev and some generic CAN driver from the network section.
Luckily, most SDcards can also be accessed via SPI. I will also try that out soon. Transfer speeds will not exceed 6MByte/s, in practice probably only half of that, but it might be enough for those who dare to extend flash memory. While probing for signals, I also noticed that the Samsung chip seems to be accessed by a single wire only, too. I might be wrong on this, but it would certainly fit the picture as max. transfer speeds do exactly match the 208MBit/s for a 1-wire eMMC connection. Maybe someone else noticed the same already.
Unfortunately, I yet only found two other useful signals routed directly to those pads: DPM_EMU0/1 (pads 16-17). I suspect that 6 other JTAG signals are also routed there, but I can't probe for them as those pads can't be configured to be used as GPIOs.
More on this to come soon...
Best,
STYLON
I just realized that I should send out a quick warning to those that are a little less well equipped with electronics gear.
Most signals on that connector are connected directly to the OMAP4430 without any buffer. They're also from the 1.8 volt domain. That means you can't connect an SD card directly to those pins.
In order to connect an SD card you need at least a level shifter (like the SN74AVCH4T245 that is already somewhere on the board) to convert signals between 1.8v and 3.3v (that's what the SD cards expect). You may also need a 3.3v LDO and connect it to the unregulated battery voltage from that connector.
I'll do some experiments with that very soon, but just wanted to order an SD card slot (don't like to solder to SD card pads directly) and some other pieces before I go ahead.
Best,
STYLON
After seeing a video where you can control a parrot AR.Drone 2.0 with the shield I started thinking up ways to control a real car with it.
Probably wont attempt this but I like the idea.
chevyowner said:
After seeing a video where you can control a parrot AR.Drone 2.0 with the shield I started thinking up ways to control a real car with it.
Probably wont attempt this but I like the idea.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
main problem i see is when shield's battery runs out.
and i wouldn't want to try it until its out beta, otherwise it might lose wifi connection lol
glitchhawk said:
main problem i see is when shield's battery runs out.
and i wouldn't want to try it until its out beta, otherwise it might lose wifi connection lol
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
most cars have a 12V socket in the cabin somewhere.....
Otherwise, this is doable.
Dependant on the age of the car and its level of security (engine electronics wise) you could either tap into the engine management units, braking and power steering (power steering alone can actually steer the car with no user input, IF the system allows it or can be modified to be controlled externally in that way, same goes for many other areas of the car) or take a direct hardware approach. Some actuators bolted to the pedals and steering wheel could easily be controlled with an arduino which can then pair via bluetooth, wifi or USB to the shield (USB would be cheapest but would prevent charging from the car lighter socket and of course mean you would have to sit in the car and might aswell drive anyway).
Cars controlled via other means have been done frequently anyway. Your only changing where the input comes from. Your idea isn't really that insane, but I wouldnt want to try it.
As for loss of power/signal. You would require some sort of "computer" aboard the car anyway. Even if its just a simple 8 bit arduino, in fact let us assume that it is an arduino UNO R3 for some reason, even that measly little 8bit CPU can be setup easily enough to detect the loss of communications with the Shield and cut the engine, engage brake etc etc.
I have a either a pandaboard es or a rasperry pi model b I can use. I am not planning on being in the car I am planning on mounting a camera about where the drivers head would be and streaming the video form that to the shield.
As for the car I am think about using a gutted 97 camaro for that, and adding a carburated 350 and some automatic trans. the most advanced computer on the car will the one to radio control it.
As far as usb power is needed there are 5 volt dc-dc regulators for cars that supply 1+ amps.
edit
Yes I know I would need to avoid running myself over.
Either one would be adequate.
I'm not a car wizard so couldnt say whether or not that camaro could have its systems directly tapped into by the pi/panda but either one could control actuators mechanically connected to the steering wheel and pedals.
As for the auto transmission, I despise the very idea of an automatic transmission and have never set in the drivers seat of an automatic vehicle let alone driven one (unless you count a 50cc scooter with a CVT). But in the case of a small computer controlling the car, probably a good idea to reduce the amount of things it has to do.
I have a twin USB adaptor in my car, max 2A shared between both sockets although that does appear to mean (with my non scientific tests as I dont own a multimeter, really need to get one actually) that with only 1 port active it can supply 2A to that port. I think it may just be a straight 12v>5v @2A converter with 2 USB's in parallel.
There are plenty of linear actuators available, for the steering a windscreen wiper motor from a truck, a pulley and some sort of feedback mechanism would be possible.
Would be a cool project, if somewhat dangerous if you don't know what your doing But get online, its been done.
SixSixSevenSeven said:
I'm not a car wizard so couldnt say whether or not that camaro could have its systems directly tapped into by the pi/panda but either one could control actuators mechanically connected to the steering wheel and pedals.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
the car currently has no interior at all
no engine
no transmission
no hood
no side windows
no steering colum
no pedals
it maybe missing some brake parts.
it is gutted.
SixSixSevenSeven said:
As for the auto transmission, I despise the very idea of an automatic transmission and have never set in the drivers seat of an automatic vehicle let alone driven one (unless you count a 50cc scooter with a CVT). But in the case of a small computer controlling the car, probably a good idea to reduce the amount of things it has to do.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
The car had a manual trans but it is gone now.
SixSixSevenSeven said:
I have a twin USB adaptor in my car, max 2A shared between both sockets although that does appear to mean (with my non scientific tests as I dont own a multimeter, really need to get one actually) that with only 1 port active it can supply 2A to that port. I think it may just be a straight 12v>5v @2A converter with 2 USB's in parallel.
Click to expand...
Click to collapse
5v 10a this is more of what i am thinking.
http://www.miniinthebox.com/dc-24v-...own-regulator-car-led-power-buck_p394573.html
Guys who might be able to help you best are probably over at letsmakerobots.com
I am a regular on there although only with 1 submission, 2nd on its way.
I'm no guru and with a project with a potential for some danger I think its probably best to not take anything I say as gospel, other than that it is possible and that the raspberry pi can probably do it (I have already used the pi for running 2 motors with speed control, a servo and ultrasound module with no issues, python plus RPIO).
should i make this
or this
then?
We just got into a new house and the heating and cooling are done using an Atlantic R32 duct type unit. Since it is blowing in all the rooms at the same time and the fact that the wired controller with the sensor is right underneath one of the vent, we have a lot of trouble getting the whole house to a satisfying temperature.
It would be a lot of money to get a brand new system with a better room temperature control, so I was thinking I could maybe use a Raspberry Pi or Arduino instead of the wired controller to create a web interface that I could use from my phone and connect multiple sensors in order to have the temperature in each room.
With the documentation that is provided for technicians, we can see that that the wiring is made of three cables, a 12V, a COM and a signal cable. I would have expected a RX and TX cable along the 12V and COM... So I'm a bit at a loss at how to start here. It seems like the communication goes both ways since they mention a discovery phase for the remote control.
I would like to know if someone has experience with hacking this kind of device and what I could do to retrieve data frames or even discover the sampling rate ?